Abolish the Article 9 Filing System by Alces, Peter A.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1995
Abolish the Article 9 Filing System
Peter A. Alces
William & Mary Law School, paalce@wm.edu
Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Alces, Peter A., "Abolish the Article 9 Filing System" (1995). Faculty Publications. Paper 287.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/287
HeinOnline -- 79 Minn. L. Rev. 679 1994-1995
Abolish the Article 9 Filing System 
Peter A. Alces* 
Who breaks a butterfly upon a wheel? 
-Alexander Pope1 
Because the filing system is the very basis of the personal 
property security law in our economy, failure of the filing system 
would undermine the complex, often subtle interaction of poli-
cies, interests, and equities vouchsafed by Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Succinctly, if the filing system fails, 
Article 9 fails.2 Incongruities in the design and operation of the 
filing system produce results inimical to the object of secured 
credit and make it worthwhile to revisit the place of the filing 
system in the Article 9 scheme and the consequences of the sys-
tem's deficiencies.3 If we expect too much of the filing system, or 
believe that we can accomplish too much through its reform, the 
object of Article 9 may be frustrated. 
I start by trying to imagine the world of secured transac-
tions without the Article 9 filing system. Let me make clear: I 
do not imagine a world without secured transactions;4 I do not 
imagine a world in which secured parties would have to publish 
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of Wil-
liam and Mary. I am indebted to Professor David Frisch for his insightful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
1. ALEXANDER POPE, EPISTLE TO DoCTOR ARBUTHNOT (1734), reprinted in 
CoMPLETE PoETICAL WoRKS OF ALEXANDER PoPE 176, 180 (Henry W. Boynton 
ed., 1903). 
2. See Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken (In re Brawn), 7 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 565, 575 (D. Me. 1970) ("It is most improbable that [Arti-
cle 9's] sponsors anticipated the extent to which secured credit under the ... 
Code would be jeopardized by the errors and omissions of secured parties in 
satisfying the simple requirements of a sufficient financing statement."), quoted 
in William C. Hillman, What's in a Name: The U.C.C. Filing System in the 
Courts, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 151, 159 n.65 (1991). 
3. See James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 
26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 823 (1993). 
4. A number of articles have reviewed the economic arguments for and 
against secured credit in some depth. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony 
T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 
1143 (1979); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 V AND. 
L. REv. 1051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests in Bankruptcy Priorities: 
A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). 
679 
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in newspapers their memoranda claiming a collateral interest in 
a debtor's assets; I do not imagine a world without Twyne's 
Case.5 I just try to think of a commercial world without filing 
and then make the case for a filing system ab initio. That is, if 
there were no filing system, would someone have· to invent it? 
What would the invention look like? 
To answer that question, we must first decide what we want 
the filing system to do. Toward this end, this Article examines 
two different models of the filing system: the informational, bul-
letin board model and the claim-staking model. According to the 
bulletin board model, the filing system serves as a source of in-
formation for interested parties to learn about the finances of 
debtors. Most obviously, it allows prospective secured creditors 
to learn to what degree a debtor has encumbered her assets. Ac-
cording to the claim-staking model, the filing system is, above all 
else, a means for secured creditors to stake their claims to the 
debtor's assets. This Article criticizes the informational model 
and builds on the claim-staking model. 
Claim-staking lies at the heart of the filing system's ration-
ale, but claim-staking alone is insufficient. Creditors not only 
want to stake their claims; they also need to know the status of 
their claims, i.e., whether they have staked their claims in a way 
that a court will recognize. In short, creditors need to verify 
their claims. 
Perversely, the present filing system makes it easy to stake 
a claim, but makes verification expensive and uncertain. The 
verifying creditor typically will hire an attorney who tells a 
paralegal to request financing statements from various filing of-
fices. From the returned filing statements, the attorney theoret-
ically can determine where her client would stand in the priority 
line provided she files in a correct manner. In essence, the pres-
ent filing system creates huge expense for creditors by requiring 
them to obtain uncertain opinions on priority. 
I propose we remove the need for attorney opinions on prior-
ity. State officials should dispositively determine priority among 
secured creditors. By enabling secured parties to obtain such 
5. 3 Coke Rep. SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). The case in-
volved a debtor's preferential, and fraudulent, transfer of assets just prior to the 
issuance of a writ of execution against the debtor. The debtor had remained in 
possession of the "transferred" property after the conveyance in form. That "os-
tensible ownership" problem informed the arguments in favor of extending the 
filing system offered by Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson. See Douglas G. 
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the 
Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 179-96 (1983). 
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certain determinations of priority, this reform would eliminate 
uncertainty and thereby reduce cost. 
Part I of this Article describes the failures of the current 
filing system and portends an even more bleak future: The 
problems with the current system may well be exacerbated 
rather than corrected by developing technologies and law revi-
sion initiatives.6 Part II then considers our ambitions for the 
system. The existence of the competing informational and 
claim-staking models demonstrates that there is not perfect 
agreement on our aspirations for Article 9 filing. It is necessary 
to discern some common interest before we can posit a system 
that will serve that interest. Part ill begins with a vision of the 
filing system, a theory of filing. It then builds on this theory by 
developing my proposal that state filing offices determine prior-
ity. I conclude that by reformulating the role of the state filing 
office and the debtor in order to better provide for creditors' ver-
i:fication needs, relatively minor adjustments to the status quo 
would make the filing system more reliable and save billions of 
dollars. 
I. THE FLAWS OF THE STATUS QUO 
Because virtually all secured obligations are satisfied with-
out the secured party's recourse to collateral, even if the current 
system were completely dysfunctional, even if no filing were 
properly indexed and no search revealed prior filings, loans se-
cured by personal property collateral would still usually be sat-
isfied. 7 Also, it would be prohibitively difficult to determine the 
number of fatally deficient filings now littering the local and cen-
tral filing offices of this country. In any event, after five years, 
6. Although the introduction of more sophisticated technology in this area 
of the law could be a very good tlrlng, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of 
the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway, LAw 
& CONTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1992, at 5, 6, if that increased technological so-
phistication is not coordinated among the filing venues, a net savings may not 
be realized. Although the cost savings effected by the proposal described in this 
Article would need to be compared with the revised filing system rather than 
just the status quo, proposed acljustments to the filing system may not in fact 
reduce attorneys' fees significantly. In any event, the drafters of the revision 
have not offered any data to establish a net reduction in attorneys' fees attribu-
table to filing system compliance. The issue remains largely ignored. 
7. That observation leaves aside, for the moment, the fact that many se-
cured loans would not be made in the first place were it not for the assumed 
integrity of the current system. 
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the good as well as the bad filings generally go aways (even 
though they may not be purged from the records).9 
Because most debtors do not go into bankruptcy, there is no 
meddlesome trustee running a fine-tooth comb through the fil-
ing records. Thus, the secured party's failure to file in the right 
place or under the correct debtor's name matters no more than 
the tree's falling in the middle of a forest. It is necessary, 
though, to appreciate what can (and does) go wrong in order to 
understand what secured parties and their counsel must do to 
avoid frustration of their expectations. 
In the last few years, the Article 9 filing system has been 
the subject of considerable study. An American Bar Association 
Task Force10 surveyed the filing practices of search services and 
state and local filing offices.11 The Task Force also devoted some 
attention to the costs of the current system, as well as to emerg-
ing technological developments that might impact the evolution 
of the system. The work of the Task Force resulted in the devel-
opment of several recommendations for reform of the filing 
system.12 
The report of the American Bar Association's Task Force on 
the state of the filing system described the deficiencies of the 
system revealed in the Task Force's survey of filing practices 
8. At least a filing ceases to matter after five years, unless a proper con-
tinuation statement is filed within the statutorily prescribed six-month period. 
See U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1990). 
9. But Harry Sigman, a member of the Article Study and Revision Com-
mittees as well as a member of the Article 9 Filing System Advisory Committee, 
has noted the filing officers' "urge to purge." 
10. The members of the Task Force participating in the study discussed in 
this Article were Mary Atkinson, John D. Berchild, Michael J. Brandt, Barbara 
Brewer Clark, Marvin Gillock, Bruce Jacobi, Professor Robert M. Lloyd (Vice 
Chair of the Task Force), Professor Ann Lousin, Professor Alemante G. Selas-
sie, Jan Whitehead Swift, and Professor Peter A. Alces (Chair). See Report of 
the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Filing System Task Force to the Per-
manent Editorial Board's Article 9 Study Committee (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter 
Filing System Task Force], in PERMANENT EDITORIAL BoARD FOR THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: 
REPORT app. at 13, 15 (1992). 
11. The Task Force survey evolved from a questionnaire developed by 
Harry Sigman, a member of the Article 9 Study and Revision Committees. In 
1991, the Task Force published the results in Survey of the U.C.C. Article Nine 
Filing System and issued a Task Force Report based on that study. See id. at 
16. 
12. In 1992, an Advisory Committee, chaired by Jan Whitehead Swift, pre-
pared a report entitled 19 Recommendations for Reform of the Filing System (on 
file with author). The Advisory Committee included representatives of constit-
uent interests in the Article 9 filing system. 
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and review of the case law.l3 The Task Force Report focused on 
the speed, accuracy, and cost of the system. A brief review of 
these findings supports the argument pursued in subsequent 
parts of this Article that we should carefully limit our ambitions 
for the filing system. 
A. SPEED OF THE SYSTEM 
Prudent secured creditors file financing statements against 
the debtor's property well before the creditor funds the loan that 
the collateral will secure.14 Besides providing the means to ap-
prise all others with whom the debtor might negotiate of the 
creditor's interest in the debtor's property, such anticipatory fil-
ing provides the creditor the means, before disbursing the loan 
proceeds, to assure that its claim is first of record and will have 
Article 9 priority.15 The prudent creditor also obtains a certified 
search, in those jurisdictions where such a thing exists, 1s 
although it is not clear that all interested parties have the same 
understanding of what the certification assures.17 
13. See Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 18-19 (describing scope 
of Task Force study}. For other, more comprehensive reviews of the case law, 
see Hillman, supra note 2, and Julianna J. Zekan, The Name Game-Playing to 
Win Under§ 9-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 HoFSTRA L. REV. 365, 
379, 433 (1990} (discussing judicial treatment of U.C.C. § 9-402}. 
14. There is, of course, no requirement that there be an obligation owed the 
debtor by the creditor in order for there to be a filing: "A financing statement 
may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest other-
wise attaches." U.C.C. § 9-402(1}. But see id. § 9-404(1} ("[W]henever there is 
no outstanding secured obligation . . . the secured party must on written de-
mand by the debtor send the debtor ... a termination statement to the effect 
that he no longer claims a security interest under the financing statement, 
which shall be identified by :file number."}. 
15. See id. § 9-402(1} & cmt. 2. 
16. Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 93-108 (providing state-by-
state data regarding availability of certified searches}. 
17. The ABA Filing System Task Force Questionnaire that supported the 
Task Force Survey asked respondents whether their state issued "certified" 
searches and, if so, what the label "certified" signified: 
Although thirty-four states reported that certified searches are 
prepared, only ten states responded that a certified search verifies that 
all statements on file in the debtor's name are included in the search 
report. The significance of a certified search in other states is unclear, 
with two [states] responding that the only significance of a certified 
search is that it contains the official seal of the Secretary of State's 
office, several reporting that certified searches are admissible in court, 
and two states responding that a certified search indicates that it was 
conducted by appropriate personnel 
Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 30-31. 
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In the credit world, time is by definition money. Uncer-
tainty that causes delay increases the cost of credit, and that 
cost is passed on to debtors (to the extent that the market will 
bear). At the margin, some debtors will be denied access to se-
cured credit when the cost of credit increases. 
So long, however, as a prospective secured party is able to 
file a financing statement and then receive a search report show-
ing it to be first of record by the time the secured creditor is 
ready to fund the loan, the system works quickly enough. But if 
a secured party-ready, willing, and able to fund a loan-is 
delayed because a filing or search report is delayed, the system 
does not work quickly enough.18 This is not to say that all se-
cured creditors will wait for the system if a search report does 
not come back by the time the secured creditor is ready to fund. 
But if the secured party proceeds with the financing without 
first obtaining the appropriate search report, and perhaps even 
if the secured party later proceeds without a subsequent report 
showing no intervening interests, 19 the system is not working as 
designed-although it may be working despite itself. 
Therefore, although the best filing system would be a sys-
tem that could assure instantaneous filing and response, efforts 
to reduce delay should be considered successful if they reduce 
delay enough to stop frustrating the expectations of participants 
in the secured credit system. At present, however, there is no 
reason to believe that the .delays in the current system have ac-
tually frustrated deals.20 To the extent that delay has not mat-
tered because secured creditors have proceeded without the 
18. See id. at 20 ("[A]lthough a filed financing statement becomes effective 
when filed, it may be some time later before it is indexed so that a search would 
disclose it."). · 
19. A party may want to proceed with financing without obtaining any 
search reports because of the costs such reports entail: 
Although the charges made for searching and filing are minimal, 
the inefficiencies of the present system impose enormous hidden costs 
on both borrowers and lenders. Perhaps the most obvious of these is 
the cost of search firms. In many jurisdictions, the response time on a 
search request submitted to the central filing office is so long that lend-
ers are forced to employ private search firms to make their searches. 
For large transactions, this cost is insignificant, but for small transac-
tions it can become important. The result in some cases is that 
searches that should be made are, in fact, not. For example, some ma-
jor commercial lenders when taking purchase money security interests 
fail to search after filing to make sure their financing statement is 
properly on file. 
Peter A Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9 Filing 
System, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 99, 107 (1991). 
20. Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 20. 
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assurances that they should require (and could expect were the 
system working better), the secured creditors' reliance on the 
system should be reexamined: Do secured creditors really need 
a faster system when they are willing to fund a loan without the 
assurances that a faster system would provide? If speed does 
not matter as much as we thought it did, what is it about the 
system that does matter? Posing the questions this way will 
help assure that we do not design more of a filing system than 
we need, at greater cost than is justified.21 
Article 9 nowhere specifies what a search report must con-
tain,22 beyond the general statement in optional section 9-407 
that upon a secured party's request 
the :filing officer shall issue his certificate showing whether there is on 
file on the date and hour stated therein, any presently effective financ-
ing statement naming a particular debtor and any statement of assign-
ment thereof and if there is, giving the date and hour of filing of each 
such statement and the names and addresses of each secured party 
therein.23 
As a matter of course, secured parties contemplating substantial 
loans will obtain a search report containing copies of all filing 
statements at any filing office in which a financing statement 
might have been filed against the debtor.24 Counsel for these-
cured party will then peruse what may be a stack of financing 
statements against the debtor's name or similar names to deter-
mine which financing statements trigger the need for a termina-
tion statement. When in any doubt (and even on occasion when 
there is no real reason for doubt) the secured party will cause a 
prior filing to be terminated.25 
Because counsel for the secured party will need to review 
each prior filing in order to opine as to her client's priority, she 
would be ill-advised to abdicate responsibility for review of prior 
filings to a filing officer or search service that generates a search 
report. So the filing system becomes a victim of its own compre-
hensiveness: The more information that search of the system 
will yield, the more attorney time required to review search re-
21. Cost here means both the cost of implementing the system as well as 
the costs imposed on secured creditors (and the secured credit system) for fail-
ing to comply with the requirements of the system. 
22. Article 9 does describe the duties of a filing officer with regard to fi-
nancing statements presented for :filing. See U.C.C. § 9-403(4). 
23. Id. § 9-407(2}. 
24. These reports are generally obtained through search services. See Al-
ces & Lloyd, supra note 19, at 107 (noting that lenders often employ private 
search firms to overcome delays in central :filing offices). 
25. See U.C.C. § 9-404 (describing termination statement). 
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suits. In other words, the more that we ask of the system, the 
more we slow it down and increase the risk that secured parties 
will refuse to slow their dealmaking to discover whatever inves-
tigation of prior filings of record might reveal. Prudence, and 
malpractice carriers, however, will settle for nothing less than 
careful deliberation. 
A number of possibilities exist for speeding up the system. 
For instance, the law or regulations could provide greater cer-
tainty about what a search report must contain. By clearly stat-
ing what documents an attorney can obtain through a search 
request, such reform would thereby determine the scope of the 
attorney's responsibility to review documents. The attorney 
would need to review only those documents pertinent to the pri-
ority determination. 
The statute could be revised to remove ambiguity where 
ambiguity requires counsel to take expensive and too often un-
necessary precautions. For example, section 9-402(8) provides 
that financing statements containing "minor errors" that are not 
"seriously misleading"26 may be effective despite their errors. 
This provides the courts a means to do equity after the fact by 
manipulating their interpretation of "seriously misleading," but 
it also creates the type of uncertainty that a conscientious attor-
ney will always resolve by assuming that a court will do that 
equity at the expense of her client, and so she will take whatever 
precautionary measures are available, at some cost. 
Similarly, reform could speed the system by reducing the 
role of subjective inquiries in determining the validity of filings. 
For instance, section 9-401(2) provides that a deficient filing is 
nonetheless effective "against any person who has knowledge of 
the contents of such financing statement."27 This provision in-
jects uncertainty into the system that generates cost by increas-
ing the burden on potential creditors, who may have to establish 
their lack of inquiry notice to survive the vicissitudes of a court's 
26. Id. § 9-402(8) ("A financing statement substantially complying with the 
requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors 
which are not seriously misleading."). Section 9-402(7) is also applicable to fi-
nancing statements that have errors: 
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization 
its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing state-
ment becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect 
a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four 
months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing state-
ment is filed before the expiration of that time. 
Id. § 9-402(7). 
27. Id. § 9-401(2). 
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post hoc "knowledge" calculus.28 This is not to argue that the 
harsh edges of the notice filing system should not, in the interest 
of fairness and equity, be smoothed by inquiry notice concepts. 
It is only to point out the costs, for the whole system, that essen-
tially subjective exceptions may generate. Although five thou-
sand attorneys will each review fifty filings for each of five 
hundred transactions just to avoid the uncertainty of post hoc 
"knowledge" determinations and never discover anything that 
could remotely put them on inquiry, their time and fees are a 
drag on the secured credit system (and, most ironically, still may 
not provide their clients the assurance they want).29 
B. AccURACY oF THE SYsTEM 
Given the volume of paper generated by the :filing system, 
and the varying degrees of competence and sophistication of 
those who feed the system, rely on the system, and maintain the 
system, it should come as no surprise that there are inaccura-
cies. Virtually every constituency with an interest in the system 
is in a position to undermine its efficacy by providing incomplete 
or inadequate information. 
Secured creditors completing a financing statement may fail 
to identify properly the debtor, the collateral, and the address of 
the debtor. Either intentionally or unintentionally, they may 
even fail to provide sufficient information about themselves to 
enable third parties to learn more about their claimed collateral 
interest.ao Although it is reasonable to conclude that the se-
cured creditors responsible for such inaccuracies should suffer 
the consequences of their own carelessness, the benefits of that 
predisposition must be balanced against the costs imposed on 
28. The UCC defines "knowledge" in subjective terms: "A person 'knows' or 
has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it." !d. § 1-201(25). 
In a related context, regarding priority to chattel paper, a recent Permanent 
Editorial Board Commentary made clear that the UCC's "knowledge" standard 
does not impose a duty of inquiry on transferees of property encumbered by an 
outstanding collateral interest. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BoARD OF THE UCC, 
PEB COMMID<'"TARY ON THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE: CoMMENTARY No. 8 
FINAL DRAFT 7-10 (1991) (addressing U.C.C. § 9-308). 
29. An attorney can never know everything that his client has "knowledge" 
of and thus can only look for whatever might trigger U.C.C. § 9-401(2). 
30. Secured parties may try to disguise the essence of their financing for a 
particular debtor. For example, to give third parties the impression that the 
debtor is a better credit risk than third parties reviewing the filings records 
may assume, finance company lenders participating with a bank in the provi-
sion of a line of credit may cause the financing statement to read "Bank of-, 
for itself and as Agent," rather than disclosing the name of the finance company 
even if the finance company is providing virtually all of the funding. 
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careful secured creditors who will go to greater expense than we 
might deem appropriate to avoid a post hoc conclusion that they 
have been careless.31 Arguably, the only beneficiaries of a con-
clusion that the secured party was careless are the unsecured 
creditors of the debtor-who realize a windfall when the puta-
tive security interest is avoided by the debtor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy. If this is the case, penalizing careless secured creditors 
the benefits of penalizing careless secured creditors do not jus-
tify the systemic costs of requiring all conscientious secured par-
ties to take extraordinary steps to preclude post hoc avoidance. 
Filing office personnel, too, add to the problem of inaccura-
cies in the system. The ABA Survey and Task Force Report re-
vealed that although most filing officers and search service 
professionals are generally satisfied with the accuracy of filing 
system searches, there are persistent problems with search ac-
curacy that will likely occur so long as there is any human inter-
vention in the system. 32 The accuracy of filing system searches 
is determined by the skill and care of those who index submitted 
financing statements and those who perform the searches. 
Turnover among filing office professionals as well as inconsisten-
cies in the filing and search procedures within filing offices un-
dermine the filing system's accuracy. Because there is such 
intraoffice inconsistency, secured parties, their counsel, and 
search services may have good reason to be uncertain about how 
the system will respond to any given filing or search request. 33 
31. This is similar to a point Professor Charles Mooney made in arguing 
that the :filing system should not have been extended to apply to lease interests 
in personal property. "[A]n unperfected lessor may be exposed to greater costs 
arising out of loss of its residual value than that incurred by an unperfected 
secured party .... [T]he effects of non perfection for lessors ... would be more 
costly than for secured creditors because lessors rely more on the leased equip-
ment." Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Owner-
ship" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing 
Requirements to Leases, 39 A.LA. L. REv. 683, 711, 713 (1988). 
32. See Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 8; see also Dwight W. 
Fawcett & Robert F. Hugi, Hidden Liens: A Trap for the Unwary, 106 BANKING 
L.J. 212, 215 (1989) ("[A]s many as 20 percent of the search reports contain an 
error of some kind."). 
33. It should be only somewhat reassuring to secured creditors that there 
may not be a good faith duty on a creditor to re:file a financing statement once 
the :filing officer has accepted it but then revoked that acceptance and returned 
the :financing statement to the secured party. The :filing is effective upon the 
:filing officer's receipt of it. U.C.C. § 9-403(1). A bankruptcy court has found 
that a secured creditor has no good faith duty to re:file when that acceptance is 
revoked. In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 16 B.R. 132, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
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Interoffice inconsistencies worsen this problem. Within 
each state that has local as well as central filing, the secured 
party will confront potentially divergent practices among the lo-
cal offices and between the local offices and the central office. 
Secured creditors who undertake transactions in several states 
will find little consistency among the different states' practices. 
While there may be no reason why Maryland should care how 
West Virginia maintains its filing system, the lack of consistency 
and coordination among the states imposes costs on secured 
transactions that are difficult to rationalize. It is not clear what 
states' rights interest is vindicated by maintaining disparate 
systems. Insofar as the personal property security law is state 
law, however, it seems unlikely that federalization of the filing 
system is imminent. 
C. THE REAL CosT OF UNCERTAINTY 
The two preceding subsections have suggested some of the 
costs generated by delays and inaccuracies in the filing system. 
So long as there is room for uncE:)rtainty in the system, as a mat-
ter of the legal, practical, or technological status quo, there will 
be work for attorneys to do. In fact, however, many attorneys 
know very little about the operation of the filing system and rely 
on paralegals and search services to deal with filing offices. The 
search services or filing offices provide attorneys with search re-
ports and the attorneys then spend the time (and client money) 
necessary to support an opinion regarding the priority of claims 
to the debtor's assets. 
Shortly after the ABA Study was completed, the ABA Task 
Force briefly considered the role of attorneys in the filing sys-
tem, particularly the attorneys' fees related to filing system is-
sues in typical secured transactions. The percentage of 
attorneys' fees related to filing issues in secured transactions is 
determined by the nature of the debtor, the type of financing, 
and the amount of the secured loan. If a debtor has many sub-
sidiaries, or has collateral in many locations, filings in more fil-
ing offices may be necessary to assure the secured party's 
priority. Similarly, all-assets financing, contemplating a secur-
ity interest in various forms of collateral, generates more filing 
system costs than would a purchase money loan in a single piece 
of equipment. The amount of the financing also may have an 
impact on the filing costs incurred by secured creditors.34 
34. This would certainly be true in states that assess a tax on secured 
transactions as part of the filing process, such as Tennessee, where a recording 
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In her report to the ABA Task Force, Meredith Jackson, 
then an associate working with the commercial law group of 
Bingham, Dana & Gould, analyzed more than 100 legal bills 
generated by the firm in its representation oflenders over a five-
year period. 35 Although the experience of other firms, with dif-
ferent groups of clients making different loans to different debt-
ors, might differ from the Bingham, Dana, & Gould fee 
pattern,36 there is no reason to believe that the firm's figures are 
significantly atypical. 
Jackson divided the fee data into three categories: small 
loans (less than $19 million), mid-size loans ($20-$74 million), 
and large loans (greater than $75 million). She then "compared 
the UCC filing costs associated with original :financings, work-
outs, and ongoing maintenance including amendments, etc., and 
costs for borrowers with two or less subsidiaries to those for bor-
rowers with three or more subsidiaries."37 Finally, she sepa-
rated the data related to attorneys' fees for loans to leasing 
companies as presented in Table 1,38 
tax of $0.115 per $100 of indebtedness is collected. TENN. ConE ANN. § 67-4-
409(b) (1994). The first $2000, however, is exempt. Id. 
35. Letter from Meredith S. Jackson. Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Professor 
Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and 
Mary 1 (May 28, 1992) (on file with autho;r). 
36. See id. ("As I stated at the ABA Spring Conference, I do not have any 
basis to assert that these results are statistically significant, as I am unable to 
evaluate in what respect our :firm's handling of these filings might differ from 
other :firms' methods."). The particular clients served by a :firm as prestigious 
as Bingham, Dana & Gould may be more likely to fund large loans to debtors 
with multiple subsidiaries in various jurisdictions-suggesting that the :firm's 
filing system-related fees would be higher than would be the case for loans 
made to smaller debtors-but there is no reason that Bingham, Dana & Gould's 
legal fees related to the filing system would be a higher percentage of the total 
legal services bill than would be the case with smaller loans to smaller debtors. 
The problem, of course, is that this important empirical work has not been 
completed, nor even taken beyond the work of the ABA Task Force. The attor-
neys' fees associated with the filing system are crucial to the cost-benefit 
calculus, and until those who would defend the filing system do empirical re-
search that would controvert the data reported by Jackson, the case for the 
filing system is uncertain. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 3. 
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Table 1. UCC Filing Costs ·as Percentage of 
Transactional Costs 
Size of Loan (in millions) 
691 
Over $75 $20-$74 Under $19 
Original Loan 2.8% 4.7% 3.9% 
Maintenance 3.6% 4.9% 1.8% 
Workout 5.4% 6.2% 4.8% 
0-2 Subsidiaries 2.2% 3.1% 4.1% 
3+ Subsidiaries 3.4% 5.1% 4.4% 
Leasing Cos. Loans 6.4% 7.8% 15.4% 
Average 3.6% 5.4% 4.2% 
The figures in Table 1 are provocative, and become even 
more so when the percentages are translated into dollars. Jack-
son reported that a typical fee for representing a secured credi-
tor is $467,100, of which 5.52% (or more than $25,000) is 
attributable to filing system cost. The lowest percentage was 
under 1% ($40 of an $11,000 bill) and the highest was 38% 
($6,935 of an $18,250 bill).39 
Whether those figures reflect what secured creditors would 
have anticipated, and whether it is the province of Article 9 revi-
sion to make choices that will reduce attorneys' fees, it seems 
clear that the figures reflected in Jackson's report are relevant 
to legislative and regulatory reform of the filing system. The 
39. Jackson reported the following figures for "Some Typical Transactions": 
Transaction 1: $45 million credit-working capital (revolving credit loan 
converting into term loan); six subsidiaries; collateral in 32 states; four-year 
billing period; total bill: $467,100; UCC filings billing: $25,770 (5.52% of total 
billings). 
Transaction 2: $75 million credit-acquisition finance (term loan) and 
working capital (revolving credit loan); 12 subsidiaries; collateral in 26 states; 
four-year billing period; total bill: $637 ,250; UCC filings billing: $26,700 
(4.19% oftotal billings). 
Transaction 3: $110 million workout (senior and sub debt restructuring); 
five subsidiaries; collateral in 18 states; 15-month billing period; total bill: 
$385,400; UCC filings billing: $18,660 (4.84% of total billings). 
Transaction 4: $12 million workout (restructuring of secured debt as one of 
four senior secured parties); 14 subsidiaries; collateral in 37 states; 15-month 
billing period; total bill: $242,750; UCC filings billing: $16,810 (6.92% of total 
billings). 
Transaction 5: $4 million start-up company working capital financing; no 
subsidiaries; collateral in four states; 13-month billing period; total bill: $9800; 
UCC filings billing: $250 (2.6% of total billings). Id. 
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figures are particularly pertinent to reform because they compel 
us to ask what we are buying for nearly 5% in the form of attor-
neys' fees in some typical secured transactions (and more than 
15% in other types of secured transactions), and whether we are 
paying too much for what we get in return.4o 
The relationship between the legal costs generated by the 
filing system and the dollar size of a particular financing trans-
action is not fixed: There is no reason to believe that the dollars 
spent on attorney time for filing issues will increase as the 
amount of the loan increases. Although there may well be some 
relationship between the loan amount and the size of the debtor, 
i.e., the debtor's number of subsidiaries and the locations of its 
assets, the relationship between the percentage of the total legal 
fee attributable to the filing system and the amount of the loan 
need not be constant.41 
40. Five percent might not be too much if the filing system provided real 
protection against the types of transactional risks that concern lenders, but it 
would be an exorbitant amount to pay if the protections are substantially less 
than they are designed to be due to incongruities in the system among the 
states and breakdown or substantial impairment of the system within particu-
lar states. The issue remains one of determining what protection the system 
needs to provide and what we should be willing to pay for that protection. 
41. By contrast, a company that sells Article 9 filing system insurance is 
currently working with several states and would sell creditors insurance at a 
premium determined by reference to the amount of the secured loan: 
Lien Priority Insurance performs all verifying, searching, analyz-
ing search results, preparing financial statements (or comparable doc-
umentation), and filing in connection with every commercial loan 
transaction. This results in our consolidating and standardizing the 
capture and processing of data. The coverage includes all costs of de-
fense. We work with lender, borrower, and their respective counsel to 
complete the underwriting and issue a policy within the time frame for 
closing. 
The cost of coverage depends on the type of coverage that is se-
lected. For all-inclusive coverage under the enclosed specimen-
wherein we would be responsible for determining where and under 
what names to search, as well as what to file, where to file, under what 
names to file, and prepare and make all required filings-, the pre-
mium would approximate 20 basis points, based on that portion of the 
loan that is secur~d by personalty (the gross loan amount, less the 
value of real estate, as determined by appraisal or title insurance). 
Frequently, however, the lender or its legal counsel determines where 
and under what names to file. In those situations, the cost usually is 
between 2.5 and 6.5 basis points. 
Please note that the premium is paid only once (like title insur-
ance). Coverage also includes the systemic risk (i.e., losses resulting 
from errors in each recordation system that is accessed). 
Letter from Gary S. Petler, President, Lien Priority Insurance Agency, Inc., to 
Peter A. Alces, Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of 
William and Mary 1 (Nov. 9, 1994) (on file with author). 
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What secured parties need, so far as the filing system is con-
cerned, is the assurance that they will have access to the 
debtor's assets (or at least the value thereof or the leverage pro-
vided by that access) in the event the debtor becomes unable (or 
unwilling) to satisfy the obligation owed the secured party. 
Thus, when a secured party invests legal fees in the filing sys-
tem, it is buying insurance.42 This insurance is not inexpensive. 
Furthermore, even if the risks to which the secured party is ex-
posed remain the same from one transaction to the next, i.e., the 
amount of the loan, the premium paid in the form of legal fees 
can vary dramatically by reference to items that are only tan-
gentially related to that risk.43 
The point here is that those who would design a filing sys-
tem must first come to terms with the cost of the current regime. 
That calculus must take into account the multifarious factors 
that determine the relationship between the cost of the current 
system and the protection it affords. This subsection has tried to 
suggest the nature of the costs involved. The next part of this 
Article turns to the benefit side of the equation: What does the 
current system buy at the current cost, and what should com-
mercial transactors realistically expect a reformed system to 
provide in the future, in light of obstacles to reform? 
IT. BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
After the ABA Task Force presented its findings to the Arti-
cle 9 Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the members of the Study Commit-
tee were asked, in an informal poll, to describe their under-
standing of the commercial reasons for the filing system.44 
42. The secured party is certainly buying a portion ofits counsel's malprac-
tice insurance, but that insurance does not protect the client against all filing 
system risk. So long as counsel was not negligent in complying with the filing 
system, the client would have no recourse against the attorney in the event that 
a :filing system malfunction, in the broader sense, impairs the client's collateral 
position. 
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (comparing the costs oflegal 
services and lien priority insurance in relation to size of loan). 
44. The Study Committee members were asked to consider both the role of 
and the need for filing: 
I would be very grateful if you might be able to take a few minutes 
to share with me your understanding of the commercial reasons for the 
filing system (whether or not you agree with those reasons). If any 
published materials reflect your understanding of the :filing issues, it 
would be very helpful if you could provide me the appropriate citations. 
Particularly, I am concerned with focusing on the role of the :filing sys-
tem (i.e., to what extent it should be a commercial law "bulletin 
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Several members of the Study Committee responded to the in-
quiry, 45 and a few did so at some length, or at least in some 
depth. 46 Some members described the filing system as a sort of 
bulletin board for credit information concerning debtors. Others 
focused on the way that the system's claim-staking function 
serves as a form of fraud insurance for secured creditors. It is 
important to assess these claims as to what the current filing 
system does: Our conclusions should frame our ambitions for 
what we want the filing system to do in the future. The sections 
below address the different functions of the filing system identi-
fied by the respondents, and then compare what we know about 
the system with reasonable aspirations for it. 
A. THE FILING SYSTEM AS BULLETIN BOARD 
The filing system arguably functions as a bulletin board, 
providing credit information concerning debtors to interested 
parties. The bulletin board paradigm, however, raises the ques-
tions: Does the filing system provide reliable credit information, 
and, if it does, to whom is it provided? · 
· A properly filed financing statement contains the names of 
the debtor and the secured party, an address of the secured 
party, a mailing address of the debtor, "and . . . a statement 
indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral."47 A 
party who searches the public filing records and discovers the 
financing statement will then know enough to ask the right 
questions: Is the named debtor in fact indebted to the secured 
party? Is the secured party of record the lender or an agent of 
the lender? Does the secured party's collateral interest in fact 
board"), and in understanding why the contours and dynamics of par-
ticular commercial contexts may determine the necessity of filing. 
Also, who would be victimized if the filing system does not work prop-
erly, or if there were no filing system at all? Finally, it would be worth-
while for me to develop a sense of attorney costs that the present 
system entails. 
Letter from Peter A. Alces, Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
The College of William and Mary, to members of the UCC Permanent Editorial 
Board Article 9 Study Committee (June 11, 1991) (on file with author). 
45. I received written responses from Howard Ruda, Of Counsel, Hahn & 
Hessen; Bradley Y. Smith, Davis, Polk & Wardell; Edwin E. Smith, Bingham, 
Dana & Gould; Steven L. Harris, Professor, University of Illinois College of Law 
(Co-Reporter of Study Committee); Paul M. Shupack, Professor, Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; and Morris W. Macey, Macey, Wi-
lensky, Cohen, Wittner & Kessler. 
46. The following portions of this Article will not attribute particular argu-
ments to particular respondents. 
47. u.c.c. § 9-402(1). 
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reach the assets described?48 In short, a search reveals the po-
tential interests of prior secured parties, at least in sufficient 
form to provoke inquiry of the debtor and those prior secured 
parties. Without access to filed financing statements, the poten-
tial creditor would have to rely on representations made by the 
debtor and information acquired through the creditor's own 
investigation. 49 
No careful counsel would suggest that the filing system is a 
surrogate for a thorough credit investigation, but the filing sys-
tem, even when it works imperfectly, so does provide information 
about prior claims to the debtor's assets. There are, of course, 
claims to the debtor's assets that would not be disclosed by filed 
financing statements. 5 1 Still, the filing system need not provide 
perfect and complete information to be a valuable source of in-
formation. It is from this perspective that the filing system as 
"bulletin board" argument proceeds. 
Proponents of the bulletin board view argue that the filing 
system can also provide interested parties with useful informa-
tion beyond that required by a minimal Article 9 financing state-
ment. It provides creditors with the means to assert their 
interest in the debtor's assets, even if that interest arises as a 
matter of contract rather than by operation of Article 9. Edwin 
E. Smith, a leading commercial attorney and a member of the 
Article 9 Study and Revision Committees, explained: 
48. Given the operation of § 9-203(1)(a) and § 9-402(1), the secured party 
will have a perfected collateral in the debtor's assets properly described in both 
the security agreement and the :financing statement. If the descriptions are not 
coextensive, the secured party will be perfected only to the extent of the more 
limited of the two descriptions. 
49. Professor Mooney points out that even with the Article 9 filing system, 
a creditor interested in the debtor's title to particular property must still inves-
tigate further: 
[E]ven if a debtor is in possession of goods and no filings are found, an 
interested person nevertheless must conduct further investigation to 
determine the nature and existence of conflicting claims to the goods. 
Such investigation is necessary even in order to determine the appro-
priate filing office to be searched. As a general matter, the Article 9 
scheme extends only to whatever rights in the goods which the debtor 
might have. The nature and extent of the debtor's rights must be di-
vined from the debtor or other sources. 
Mooney, supra note 31, at 749 (citations omitted). 
50. The party searching the filing system who comes across an improperly 
filed :financing statement is on notice of the claim represented by that :financing 
statement and would be subordinate to that creditor's claim. U.c.c: § 9-401(2). 
51. See, e.g., id. § 9-310 (providing that certain business liens "given by 
statute or rule of law ... take[ ] priority over a perfected security interest"). 
HeinOnline -- 79 Minn. L. Rev. 696 1994-1995
696 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:679 
I also seem to have little problem with the concept of the Article 9 
filing system being used as a commercial "bulletin board". I have seen 
this technique used on various occasions for negative pledge agree-
ments and subordination agreements. In the case of a negative pledge 
agreement, of course, it is in the interest of the creditor in whose favor 
the negative pledge is granted to put other creditors on notice of the 
existence of a negative pledge. In the case of a lender filing a subordi-
nation, it is in the interest of the debtor to provide comfort to a new 
senior creditor extending credit to the debtor that the senior creditor 
will in fact be senior. Although neither example fits squarely into the 
original purposes of the Article 9 filing system, it seems to me that the 
commercial "bulletin board" approach, by providing even additional in-
formation about the debtor than that required by the Article 9 filing 
system, is useful. And, as the examples indicate, can benefit either the 
creditor or the debtor depending on the particular circumstances. 52 
Even if secured creditors and debtors file nothing more than the 
prototypical forms of financing statement, rather than the forms 
of agreement that Smith discussed, the system will provide in-
formation that searchers may find useful beyond merely making 
the priority determination. Those in the business of selling 
money may rely on the filing system in order to find potential 
customers in what can be a very competitive market, by discov-
ering who has borrowed from whom and in order to acquire 
what. There is no reason that inquisitive competitors could not 
search the system to see what the business down the street or 
across town has been up to lately. 
The system also operates as a bulletin board when it pro-
vides just the information that those who designed the system 
intended it to disclose: the relative priority of claims to assets of 
particular debtors. It affords those interested in doing business 
with the debtor on a credit basis invaluable information about 
the debtor's ability to provide sufficient security, information 
that can determine the terms upon which the creditor will make 
credit available to the debtor. 
Dean Douglas Baird was one of the first commentators to 
reflect on the bulletin board potential and reality of the filing 
system. 5 3 He concluded that the system does operate as a relia-
ble and worthwhile bulletin board for the benefit of prospective 
secured creditors, but does not effectively serve the interests of 
52. Letter from Edwin E. Smith, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Professor Pe-
ter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary 
1-2 (July 31, 1991) (on file with author). 
53. Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Owner-
ship, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983). 
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other transactors, such as unsecured creditors. Without a filing 
system, 154 Baird explained that potential secured creditors 
would have to investigate [the debtor's] financial condition in greater 
detail or charge a higher rate. Alternatively, [the secured creditor] 
could shift (but not eliminate} the risk by forcing [the debtor] to post a 
bond or by finding some third party to guarantee [the debtor's] owner-
ship of the property he possesses.5 5 
Baird started from the appropriate perspective, the relative 
costs and benefits of abandoning the filing system,ss and con-
cluded that the system is worth the candle: 
The information that the Code provides secured creditors in its filing 
system is exactly tailored to their need to know whether any claim they 
make to a particular asset will have priority over any other. The filing 
system is, in effect, a place where secured creditors stake claims to the 
debtor's property. 57 
Baird is correct. The existence of the filing system is the best 
argument for the filing system. If the system did not exist, there 
would be no certain way to "stake a claim" to a debtor's assets.ss 
The filing system is not merely evidence of a claim to particular 
personal property, it is the sum and substance of that claim. So 
the overwhelming benefit of the system is not the information it 
provides, but the legal consequences that flow from the existence 
of the information source. In Baird's words, "it makes the exist-
ence of property rights public in a clear and unambiguous 
way."S9 
This vision of the system may overstate its efficacy,60 and it 
certainly fails to consider the consequences of the filing system's 
54. Baird noted that many discussions of the Article 9 filing system "do not 
address the question[] why there should be any filing system at all." Id. at 55. 
55. ld. at 56. The type of guaranties Baird suggested are common, 
although the secured party generally has the guarantor assume secondary lia-
bility for the principal obligation rather than guarantee the debtor's ownership. 
This is essentially the same as having the guarantor guarantee ownership, but 
is short of having an insurance company issue a title policy. Baird noted that a 
creditor could "rely on a third party (similar to a title insurance company) to 
provide information and to guarantee the information's accuracy." Id. at 58. 
56. ld. at 60. 
57. I d. at 62. 
58. Baird recounted Professor Schwartz's and Dean Scott's application of a 
"prospecting" theory to the filing system: "[T]hese rules ... allow a creditor who 
bas discovered a good credit risk (like a miner who has discovered a valuable 
mineral deposit or an inventor who has hit upon a new idea} to have exclusive 
rights to the financing opportunity." Id. at 63 (citing ALAN ScHWARTZ & RoBERT 
ScoTT, CoMMERciAL TRANsACTIONs: PRINciPLEs AND PoLiciEs 594-97 (1982}}. 
59. Id. at 63. 
60. Baird may have more confidence in the :filing system than the ABA 
Task Force Study would suggest is warranted. He asserts: "[A] creditor can 
lend money to a debtor with confidence because he knows (by looking at the 
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uncertainty. A secured party who has done nothing wrong or 
careless may be a victim of the system if the system's deficien-
cies compromise its effectiveness at providing information. Be-
cause the filing system establishes priority, the cost of mistakes 
is greater than it would be if the system were merely a source of 
information. Furthermore, the cost of making sure there are no 
mistakes may be greater even in cases where there are no mis-
takes. Thus, there are costs both when the system fails and 
when it works, because it works so uncertainly, and the pros-
pects for making its operation more certain are not favorable. s1 
The cost of the system when it does properly describe the prior-
ity of contestants to the debtor's assets is a cost that we have 
come to ignore, but must not ignore, if we want to make an argu-
ment for a system in anything like its current form. 
Baird also considered what information the system actually 
needs to provide in order to effectively give notice of the possible 
existence of prior security interests. His conclusion does not 
support an elaborate bulletin board conception. The filing sys-
tem, rather than rewarding inquiry with the full details of re-
corded security interests, merely "gives notice only of a duty to 
inquire further"62 to determine if prior security interests encum-
ber a debtor's assets. A filing system can perform this notice 
function without providing much in the way of a bulletin board. 
If, however, we want the filing system only to perform a notice 
function, why should the statute require that a filed financing 
statement contain much beyond the name of the secured party 
and the debtor? One answer is that the system is a priority reg-
ister, not just an information source, and we might not want to 
make it too easy to gain a priority claim to assets. Another an-
swer would be that we do trust the system to provide some infor-
mation, to operate incidentally as a partial bulletin board, even 
if we do not want to come to terms with the consequences of the 
system's failure to provide the information effectively. 
files) that no other existing creditor can claim an interest in the property supe-
rior to his own." I d. at 63 (citation omitted). 
61. The political obstacles to reform are considerable: The filing system is 
not particularly important to Secretaries of State, the public officials charged 
with its maintenance. Indeed, there may be undesirable consequences for a 
Secretary of State who endeavors to effect real reform of the system. 
62. Baird, supra note 53, at 61.· Baird did acknowledge that there is noth-
ing in the UCC that requires the secured party of record to respond to third-
party inquiries. Id. As a matter of fact, however, there may be good business 
reason for creditors to cooperate with one another. 
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On balance, it may be that we would be most comfortable 
with a system that merely imparts inquiry notice. A pure in-
quiry notice system would provide less (and less specific) infor-
mation than the current partial bulletin board system, but it 
might cost less to maintain. Also, the less ambitious our design 
of the system, the less that can go wrong with it. If the system 
then fails to provide information that the market demands, the 
market, I assume the law-and-economics types will point out, 
will obtain the information some other way.ss And it is not clear 
that this other way will cost as much as the current system 
costs. The work that must be done to support that determina-
tion has not yet been done in the various Article 9 contexts, nor 
is it clear that it is even contemplated. 
Wholly apart from Baird's conclusion that the system does 
not really serve as a bulletin board to inform the commercial 
choices of unsecured creditors is the question of whether adjust-
ment of the system could enhance its utility by providing relia-
ble information to unsecured creditors at a reasonable cost. It 
may be that unsecured creditors do not use the current system 
because the benefit of using it is not worth the cost. That is, the 
information the system provides unsecured creditors is too in-
complete to be of much use to unsecured creditors and obtaining 
that incomplete information is too costly. The revisers of Article 
9 could enhance the value of the information the system pro-
vides or reduce the cost of obtaining that information. That is, 
they could do so in theory. But I doubt whether they could do so 
in fact: Requiring candor and truthfulness in filings would 
likely prove to be merely a hortatory admonition. 
In any event, it is not clear how much unsecured creditors 
really need financial information concerning the value of their 
individual debtor's assets. Many if not most unsecured creditors 
who sell on open account do so and then worry later if the debt is 
not satisfied. The cost of the goods and services provided by un-
secured creditors probably reflects, to the extent the market will 
bear, some premium to cover bad debts. If it cost unsecured 
creditors nothing to find out which accounts will be paid and 
which will not before the fact, they would certainly take advan-
tage of that information and price their goods or services accord-
ingly. But even perfect information about a debtor's payment 
history is only probative and not determinative of the debtor's 
63. Edwin Smith's commentary on this Article notes alternative sources of 
credit information. See Edwin E. Smith, Commentary on Abolish the Article 9 
Filing System by Professor Peter Alces, 79 MINN. L. REV. 715, 718 (1995). 
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payment in the future. So the price charged by an unsecured 
creditor would reflect a certain nonpayment risk anyway, even if 
unsecured creditors had perfect information about the payment 
histories of all of their debtors. 
Baird recognized that the filing system does not provide per-
fect information; it affords inquiry notice, notice of little value 
unless you are prepared to pursue the inquiry. Insofar as it i.s 
unclear that the system will provide unsecured creditors more 
reason to inquire than they would have without first reviewing 
the system, or will reduce the cost of such an inquiry, there is 
not much information that the system has to offer unsecured 
creditors. After all, by deciding not to require collateral, the un-
secured creditor is agreeing to be subordinate to later-in-time 
perfected secured parties. So even if the unsecured creditor 
were to learn something from the system, later events could 
render the most perfect information moot. 64 
Using the filing system would also impose costs on the un-
secured creditor, i.e., the cost of discovering where to search the 
filing records, actually searching those records, and then distil-
ling from those records legal and financial information pertinent 
to the unsecured creditor's credit decision. Insofar as the credi-
tor contemplating secured status65 or the potential purchaser of 
the debtor's assets66 runs the risk of obtaining actual knowledge 
of a misplaced filing, the unsecured creditor may be even worse 
off for having performed a search of the system. 67 
It is also true that many unsecured creditors would have no 
way to search a filing system before they could assert a claim 
against the debtor's assets. Nonconsensual creditors, those with 
claims arising from the debtor's tortious activity, are not within 
the contemplation of the notice function of the filing system. But 
64. Baird noted that, although the :filing system is not designed to serve the 
interests of unsecured creditors, it is of some use to them. Baird, supra note 53, 
at 61-62. He concluded that those who have argued in favor of abolishing the 
system have done so because they have failed to appreciate that the system is 
meant to serve the interests of secured, not unsecured, creditors. Id. at 62 (cit-
ing Allison Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARv. L. 
REv. 588 (1949)). 
65. Or, the unsecured creditor who later takes a judicial lien. 
66. The buyer of equipment would likely not be a buyer in the ordinary 
course of business and so would take subject to any security interest, even an 
unperfected security interest, of which that buyer has knowledge. U.C.C. § 9-
301(1)(c). 
67. See id. § 9-401(2) (providing that deficient :filings are nonetheless effec-
tive "against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing 
statement"). 
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some consensual creditors, the less sophisticated perhaps, might 
not even know that there is an Article 9 filing system, and even 
a larger group of creditors would not appreciate the conse-
quences of the notice filing system in any event. 
Yet the most prominent reason why unsecured creditors 
may as well ignore the Article 9 filing system is the fact that 
federal bankruptcy law effectively gives unsecured creditors a 
lien against the debtor's assets when they most need one: when 
the debtor is in bankruptcy. As Professor White has demon-
strated, a great deal of Article 9 filing system action occurs in 
the bankruptcy court under the current regime.ss 
For the reasons discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, it is 
not difficult to appreciate why the filing, system does not serve 
an informational need of unsecured creditors. The question re-
mains, then, whether the informational benefits that the system 
provides secured creditors justify the associated costs it imposes 
on them. 
The current system, so far as secured creditors are con-
cerned, provides a far from perfect bulletin board. Apart from 
the priority ordering function, the filing system is a relatively 
convenient, if not very reliable, place to put information that you 
would like other potential or existing69 secured parties to ac-
quire. There is, however, no guaranty that anyone will actually 
learn what you want them to learn and no filing system sanction 
imposed for a failure to heed the bull~tin board information. 
Furthermore, it may be that a cost of enhancing the bulletin 
board function is disruption of the priority function of the filing 
system. The more we ask of the system the greater the cost in 
cluttering the system-more paper, more attorney time going 
through it, more opportunity for error. At some point, it could be 
that the cost of providing certain information exceeds the com-
mercial benefits of providing it. At least it would seem that we 
should have a better sense of the costs and benefits of the status 
quo before we decide to increase the burdens on the system. Do 
we know enough to say with any confidence that the benefits of 
relying on the system to provide broader credit information 
would exceed the costs of such a model? That is unlikely, insofar 
as we have yet to come to terms with the costs of the current 
system in each of the various secured credit contexts. We have 
68. See White, supra note 3, at 830-41. 
69. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4)-(5) (providing certain later purchase money se-
cured parties priority over prior secured parties of record). 
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continued to assume the efficacy, the inevitability of the system; 
we have yet to establish the system's efficacy. 
B. THE FluNG SYSTEM AS FRAUD INSURANCE 
Many commentators argue that the filing system's primary 
purpose is to provide creditors with insurance against the risk 
that a debtor will impose secret liens on its assets to frustrate 
the claims of creditors.70 There are two principal ways in which 
this fraudulent "secret lien" problem might arise. The first form 
involves a conspiracy between a debtor and a creditor to deceive 
the debtor's other creditors. As Professor Paul Shupack71 and 
Morris Macey have noted, 72 the filing system establishes, with 
some certainty, "the earliest possible date for perfection of the 
interest of the secured party."73 Without the date certainty that 
the filing system provides, an unscrupulous debtor and creditor 
could, in some states, defraud earlier lien creditors. For in-
stance, Mr. Macey noted that, prior to the enactment of Article 9 
in Georgia, a bill of sale to secure debt was effective to perfect a 
collateral interest in personal property and did not require filing 
for perfection. 74 A debtor and creditor could defraud earlier lien 
creditors by backdating a bill of sale that created a security in-
terest in the creditor's favor. 
The Article 9 system is not, however, the only conceivable 
means to prevent such fraud. For instance, this type of fraud 
might be avoided by requiring some official notation on an offi-
cial record stating the date on which a debtor granted a collat-
eral interest in particular property. 75 Such a device would not 
70. See, e.g., David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Fil-
ing Under Article 9 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U. L. REv. 1, 209 (1979) (advocating 
greater reliance on perfection through filing that serves as insurance to many 
creditors rather than perfection through possession). 
71. Letter from Paul M. Shupack, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, Yeshiva University, to Professor Peter Alces, Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law, The College ofWilliam and Mary 1-2 (July 29, 1991) (on file with 
author). 
72. Letter from Morris W. Macey, Macey, Wilensky, Cohen, Wittner & 
Kessler, to Professor Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The Col-
lege of William and Mary 1 (July 2, 1991) (on file with author). 
73. Letter from Paul M. Shupack to Professor Peter Alces, supra note 71, at 
1. 
74. Letter from Morris W. Macey to Professor Peter A. Alces, supra note 72, 
at 1. 
75. This type of record would be desirable in any event given the timing 
issues that may arise in Article 9litigation-concerning future advances, after-
acquired property, and purchase money security interests-and in subsequent 
bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547,548 (1988) (covering preferences 
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be foolproof, but it might close enough of the fraudulent-dating 
loophole to justify its adoption. The test is whether the device 
buys enough protection at sufficient savings over the status quo 
to reduce the real cost of secured lending. 
The filing system also prevents pure debtor fraud-the kind 
that the debtor commits without the help of a collusive creditor 
by granting successive collateral interests in the same property 
without notifying each secured party of the (prior) adverse 
claimants. This is the true secret lien problem and, for some, it 
is the raison d'etre of the filing system. If the filing system did 
not provide an effective means to avoid the risk of pure debtor 
fraud, there might not be any remaining viable argument in 
favor of the filing system. So if there is to be a filing system, it 
must reduce, if not eliminate entirely, this fraud risk.76 
There are two interrelated elements to the secret lien fraud 
risk: Some claims against the debtor's property may remain "se-
cret" but effective notwithstanding the Article 9 filing system, 
and enterprising debtors who find their schemes frustrated by 
Article 9 may well find other means to defraud a secured 
creditor. 
Article 9 gives effect to a number of ostensibly "secret" liens. 
For instance, section 9-310 recognizes the priority of certain 
non-Article 9 collateral interests arising by operation of state 
law so long as the liens are possessory.77 Given the possession 
requirement, these potentially secret liens do not pose a serious 
threat to the integrity of the filing system. 78 Also, counsel for 
secured lenders spend time reviewing the available compendia 
of non-uniform state liens prior to closing secured loans so that 
their creditor clients can try to obtain necessary subordination 
agreements, or at least so that counsel's closing opinion letter 
can except assets within the scope of the secret liens. 
Professor Lynn LoPucki has developed a catalog of ten sce-
narios in which the current filing system would not reveal an 
effective prior claim to the debtor's assets to even a very diligent 
secured party-searcher of the filing records:79 
and fraudulent transfers). See generally PETER A. ALoEs, THE LAw OF FRAunu. 
LENT TRANSACTIONS, cbs. 5-6 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (describing statutory and 
common law responses to various types of fraudulent dispositions). 
76. There may be so many other debtor-fraud risks that the risk of pure 
debtor fraud is relatively insignificant. 
77. u.c.c. § 9-310. 
78. Ostensible ownership issues would not be implicated because the col-
lateral interests recognized in U.C.C. § 9-310 are possessory. 
79. LoPucki, supra note 6, at 7-9. 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
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Filings against the debtor's predecessor in title;so 
Defective :filings;sl 
Filings not yet appearing of record;B2 
Filings in former name of debtor;ss 
Effective filings in other jurisdictions;s4 
Filings against mobile goods prior to debtor's 
relocation;s5 
Local filings that remain effective after debtor 
relocates;86 
Filings relating to goods whose characterization has 
changed;87 · 
Automatic perfection contexts;88 and 
Filings that diligent search would not reveal but which 
courts later determine a diligent search should have 
revealed. 89 
There are, as well, claims to assets that are effective by opera-
tion of some other, non-Article 9 filing system, e.g., tax liens and 
judgments. 90 
It is difficult to tell whether reform of the system could 
avoid the problems associated with these hidden (if not secret) 
interests. Whether we should even attempt to eliminate all such 
hidden interests should be a matter of cost/benefit analysis: 
Recognizing that no system will be airtight, what are the margi-
nal costs of getting closer to a vacuum compared with the margi-
nal benefits of each incremental step? Before we can even 
compose that equation, we must frame our reasonable aspira-
tions for the system. 
80. See id. at 7 & n.5 (citing U.C.C. § 9-402(7) & cmt. 8; Jay L. Westbrook, 
Glitch: Section 9-402(7) and the U.C.C. Revision Process, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
408 (1984)). 
81. Id. at 7 (citing U.C.C. § 9-403(1)). 
82. Id. (citing Filing System Task Force, supra note 10, at 57-63). 
83. I d. (citing Westbrook, supra note 80). 
84. Id. at 8 (citing U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d)). 
85. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(e)). 
86. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 9-401(3)). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 8-9; see also Phillips, supra note 70 (advocating more structured 
filing system to avoid problems inherent in perfection through possession). 
89. LoPucki, supra note 6, at 9 & n.19 (citing Zekan, supra note 13). 
90. See Baird, supra note 53, at 59 n.18. 
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C. WHArts A F'n.ING SYsTEM TO Do? 
Commentators have wondered for some time just what it is 
we want the filing system to achieve. Baird concluded that we 
want the system to provide a place to stake claims to assets. 91 
Other commentators focus on debtor (and secured party) fraud 
problems. 92 Still others focus on the bulletin board benefits the 
filing system provides. 93 Although it may be that true consen-
sus about the role of the filing system has yet to be realized, 
there does seem to be general agreement that the system en-
hances the value of a creditor's collateral interest in the debtor's 
assets. 94 Without the certainty of priority (at whatever level) 
that the system provides, secured creditors would have to charge 
a higher interest rate to compensate themselves for the in-
creased risk to which they would be exposed if there were no 
similarly certain means to assure priority. This argument, how-
ever, depends on the assumption that the incremental benefit 
provided by the system is greater than the cost of providing that 
benefit. 
So, to assess the value of the current filing system, it is nec-
essary to measure the incremental benefit and to appreciate the 
true costs. The thesis of this Article is that the commentators 
who have heretofore extolled, or at least assumed, the benefits of 
the current filing system have failed to come to terms with 
either the costs of the system or the incremental benefits it pro-
vides. Furthermore, proponents of reform of the filing system-
and all of Article 9, for that matter-compound the problem of 
inadequate cost/benefit analysis by proposing agenda that do not 
properly consider the real and probably insurmountable95 obsta-
cles to reform. But it is only after careful cost/benefit analysis 
91. ld. at 63. 
92. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing arguments 
that date certainty from filing system prevents various types of fraud). 
93. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 31-37 (discussing benefits of "bulletin 
board" approach to Article 9 filings); supra note 52 and accompanying text 
(quoting letter from Edwin E. Smith). 
94. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 175 (explaining that the filing 
system provides secured parties with inexpensive means to perfect collateral 
interests, enabling secured parties to charge lower interest rates than if they 
lacked certainty about priority of their claims). The authors do note, however, 
that "[t]he Code assumes that [the benefit provided by the filing system] out-
weighs the costs imposed upon secured parties by the requirement that they 
take possession or file." Id. 
95. The term "insurmountable" is used here in an economic sense: If the 
benefits of overcoming obstacles to reform are less than the costs of achieving 
reform, the obstacles are insurmountable for all intents and purposes. 
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that the important work on an alternative to the current filing 
system should properly proceed. 
Contemporary apologists for the filing system have urged 
its expansion: They advocate adjusting the filing system so that 
it would apply to more contexts than those currently contem-
plated by Article 9. Baird and Jackson would impose a filing 
requirement in lease transactions to respond to an ostensible 
ownership problem96 that Professor Mooney has proven does not 
exist.97 Professor LoPucki recognizes that the current system is 
not only incomplete, but fatally defective, 98 and yet he proposes 
that the design of a revised system be enhanced so that search-
ers could obtain more-and more reliable-information from a 
review of filings. 99 
These arguments for expansion apparently fail to recognize 
that by increasing the burden we impose on the system we 
would make it less reliable. The ABA Task Force Report demon-
strates that many systemic deficiencies are a product of the vol-
ume of information that the system accumulates. If the current 
system is collapsing of its own weight, how do we improve it by 
compounding the problems that currently plague it? Further-
more, the proposals for expansion of the system do not offer evi-
dence, empirical or otherwise, that secured creditors cannot and 
do not now obtain the information that the proposed enhance-
ments would provide. Nor do they demonstrate that the costs 
saved by having the system provide the information are more 
than the increased costs imposed on the system, and therefore 
on secured credit, by having the system provide the information 
that concerned creditors now seem to be able to discover (to their 
satisfaction) without the help of the filing system. 
Professor LoPucki's proposal does make clear that the en-
hanced role he perceives for the system woul~ only evolve as the 
system takes greater advantage of technological innovation.100 
He notes that there is substantial room for improvement given 
the relative lack of sophistication in the current system. He is 
right about the deficiencies of the status quo, but he fails to rec-
ognize that the very same factors that have prevented the sys-
96. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 186-90 (arguing that :filing lease 
transactions would avoid potential conflicts from third-party interests in per-
sonal property). 
97. See Mooney, supra note 31. 
98. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 6-15 (arguing that the current system is 
too cumbersome and unreliable to allow complete searches). 
99. Id. at 15-31. 
100. Id. 
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tern from keeping up with the ostensible information needs of 
secured creditors under the current law will also prevent the 
system from satisfying secured creditors' desires for the foresee-
able future. To oversimplify, there are two principal impedi-
ments: a lack of funds and a lack of incentive. The case has 
simply not been made to filing system operators that they have 
anything to gain from improving the system. Keep in mind that 
the Maryland Secretary of State has no reason to care about how 
her West Virginia counterpart searches for and files financing 
statements. 
It is from this pessimistic perspective that my conception of 
a filing system emerges. The system should do no more than we 
are absolutely certain it could do well, namely, insuring a se-
cured party by providing a memorandum of collateral interest 
that clearly affords the secured party the priority rights pro-
vided by Article 9. I am not convinced that the memorandum 
need be published or notorious so long as it exists and the se-
cured party is assured the first-in-time priority that is the prem-
ise of Article 9. The next part of this Article describes a filing 
regime that could effectively serve the secured party's (and the 
secured credit system's) need for this type of credit insurance 
that the current system is designed-but fails-to provide. 
ill. THE STATE ASSURANCE MODEL 
A. A PLAcE TO START 
Although it is evident that secured creditors look to the fil-
ing system to stake claims to assets of their debtors, the extent 
to which they actually rely on the system is uncertain, and likely 
varies from one creditor and one transaction to the next. Brad-
ley Smith, a member of the Article 9 Study Committee, ex-
plained that in his "own practice, which focuses on big ticket 
transactions and large companies, the functioning of the filing 
system is of relatively limited importance. My clients tend to 
rely on other due diligence measures to a greater extent."101 If 
that observation reflects the experience of similarly situated 
commercial counsel, it would be worthwhile to take that lack of 
101. Letter from Bradley Y. Smith, Davis Polk & Wardwell, to Professor Pe-
ter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary 1 
(July 12, 1991) (on file with author). It may be that not all counsel appreciate, 
as Mr. Smith does, the limited efficacy of the current system. To the extent 
people think it works more reliably than it actually does (and they are likely to 
think so because almost all loans are repaid) they are likely to miscalculate its 
value and be comfortable paying for it at the current rate. 
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reliance on the system into account when deciding what alterna-
tive to the status quo might adequately serve commercial inter-
ests. How much insurance in the form provided by the filing 
system do creditors such as those represented by Smith need to 
buy, and how much should they have to pay for it? 
So my imagination of a world without a filing system begins 
with a very limited view of the benefits provided by the system, 
a view informed by the scope, efficacy, and commercial value of 
the current system. Admittedly, I paint my picture of the filing 
system landscape with a broad brush. My arguments in favor of 
abolishing the current system and starting all over again-with-
out assuming either the need for or the effectiveness of the cur-
rent system-proceed from what may be insufficient 
discrimination among the various secured transaction contexts. 
It may well be that the present filing system works better in 
some settings and not so well in others (determined by reference 
to the type and value of the collateral and the sophistication of 
the creditors and debtors as well). Nonetheless, I would impose 
the burden on those arguing in favor of the present filing regime 
to provide empirical evidence of its efficacy. That is, those who 
would defend a filing requirement must establish that the se-
cured credit system is more efficient with that requirement than 
without it. To the extent that they can demonstrate in particu-
lar contexts that a filing requirement works (and not merely be-
cause it does not often matter that it fails), a revised Article 9 
should, through statute and regulation, provide for its applica-
tion to those contexts.102 Even in those limited contexts, how-
ever, advocates of a filing system must demonstrate that 
imposition of a public notice requirement is the least expensive, 
most efficient means to the desired end. 
From these premises, from this limited filing theory, anal-
ternative emerges. 
102. This type of inquiry into the extent that a filing requirement works in 
particular situations distinguishes Mooney's article in response to Baird and 
Jackson's ostensible ownership thesis. See Mooney, supra note 31 (critiquing 
proposals to extend filing reqUirement to leases); Baird & Jackson, supra note 5 
(arguing for extending Article 9 notification rules to leases and other bail-
ments). In fact, Mooney's argument is so convincing that it would seem he has 
already made the case for excepting purchase money security interests in 
equipment (the Article 9 analogue oflease transactions) from the Article 9 filing 
requirement. I am indebted to Professor David Frisch for recognizing this con-
sequence of the Mooney critique. 
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B. A SKETCH OF THE STATE Fn.!NG AssURANcE MonEL 
The central purpose of Article 9 filing is to allow creditors to 
stake their place in the priority line. Perversely, the system al-
lows creditors to stake their claims but requires them to spend a 
great deal of money to learn if their claims might be valid. Cred-
itors' counsel must sift through piles of documents to produce 
uncertain opinions on priority. A new filing system should focus 
on Article 9's claim-staking insurance function but provide cred-
itors with an efficient, inexpensive means to verify the validity 
of their security interests. One easy way to realize this goal 
would be to provide state filing offices the power to determine 
priority. 
Under the current Article 9 filing and search systems, the 
different :filing offices accept financing statements, put them into 
the system, and provide access to the records the :filings create. 
The efficacy of the system, as the preceding parts of this Article 
have demonstrated, depends on the system's providing a certain 
way for secured creditors to assert their claims to the debtor's 
assets. It is the filing offices that control the information that 
determines the priority of an asserted claim. But the filing office 
in no way makes the determination that a particular creditor 
has a prior claim. The filing offices only provide access to the 
information from which that conclusion might be inferred. 
Many of those who have been concerned with the operation 
of the filing system have argued that the :filing offices, and indi-
vidual filing officers, should be mere conduits for financing state-
ments: They should accept whatever financing statements 
creditors present to them so long as the creditors pay the re-
quired fee. They should then let the courts and counsel sort out 
priority claims after the fact. There is a good deal to commend 
this view. Filing office staffs usually do not have the legal train-
ing to exercise the type of judgment that is required to deter-
mine Article 9 priority. A fact of bureaucratic life is that there is 
significant turnover in :filing offices, where even the best paid 
administrators may not command the salaries that would at-
tract people to dedicate their professional lives to the sweet sci-
ence of Article 9 financing statements. 
Consider, however, what would happen to the cost of the fil-
ing system if the :filing offices issued assurances that the secured 
party filing a financing statement had a particular priority claim 
to the debtor's assets. That is, would the costs of the current 
system be reduced without too great a loss of benefit if filing of-
fices provided creditors the same assurance that a private in-
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surer could provide by issuing something like credit insurance? 
Filing offices would certainly have to increase the fees they 
charge to reflect the insurance cost of providing such priority as-
surances. But this reform would also eliminate a substantial 
portion of the attorneys' fee cost generated by the current sys-
tem.103 Secured creditors' counsel would have no reason to issue 
a priority opinion because the assurance of the filing office would 
determine priority. 
If filing offices insured creditors against priority risk, then 
the costs of the system's malfunction would be imposed on the 
actors in the best position to maintain the system: the public 
filing offices. Shifting the risk of priority loss would provide in-
centive to develop and maintain coherent practices to make the 
priority determination more certain. It would, in sum, cause the 
state filing offices to internalize what are now externalities. 
Every dollar in claims not paid out of the state insurance fund 
would be money that the state could keep, so there would be real 
compensation for assuring the integrity of the system. 
While requiring filing offices to make priority determina-
tions would entail that filing officers exercise legal judgment, 
due to the determinative nature of that judgment, it should cost 
secured creditors less than what they currently pay when buy-
ing uncertain priority opinions from attorneys. The uncertainty 
of the present system costs money; the state assurance filing 
system would eliminate that uncertainty. Once counsel no 
longer opines as to priority, counsel should be satisfied as long 
as the filing officer issues the priority assurance. And if the fil-
ing officers require that the collateral description be printed on 
orange paper, creditors' counsel need only comply; she need not 
reason why. Counsel will be comfortable with the filing office's 
judgment, because the secured creditor is protected whether the 
filing office erred in its priority judgment or not. 
Such a system would also avoid most of the wasteful Article 
9 litigation over perfection described by Professor White.104 
Outside of the bankruptcy context, an unperfected secured party 
has priority over an unsecured creditor.105 In the bankruptcy 
context, however, if a creditor loses perfected status, then the 
creditor also loses secured status.106 This naturally creates an 
103. The attorney for the creditor would still prepare the financing 
statement. 
104. See White, supra note 3 (discussing the cost of unnecessary filings and 
litigation regarding secured creditors' perfection). 
105. u.c.c. § 9-301(1). 
106. The Bankruptcy Code provides that: 
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incentive for trustees in bankruptcy to litigate the issue of 
perfection so as to create a windfall for the unsecured creditors. 
Under the regime proposed here, however, so long as the se-
cured party receives the dated certificate of priority from the fil-
ing office, the secured creditor has nothing to fear from the 
trustee in bankruptcy: The security interest will, necessarily, be 
perfected. This result would naturally decrease the trustees' in-
centive for litigation. The state filing officer's assurance would 
also determine the date of perfection for purposes of preference 
and fraudulent transfer inquiries in bankruptcy.1o1 
Certainty of perfection in this context would have the added 
benefit of reducing attorneys' fees related to preparation of fi-
nancing statements. Again, creditor's counsel would no longer 
have to worry whether a bankruptcy judge could later determine 
that the creditor's collateral interest is unperfected: The issu-
ance of the priority certificate would foreclose the perfection in-
quiry. As the requirements for and success of perfection would 
be clearer under the state assurance filing model, attorneys 
could prepare filing documents with less worry and more 
efficiency. 
The state filing assurance system would also prevent fraud, 
much as the current system does. By providing a certain date 
for perfection, it would prevent debtors and creditors from col-
luding to manufacture the priority of a secured party to defraud 
later creditors. lOB The state filing assurance alternative would 
also respond to the other type of fraud risk, the true "secret lien" 
risk that the debtor will fail to disclose to one potential secured 
party the existence of a competing security interest. The cur-
rent filing system prevents this sort of fraud by ensuring that a 
creditor considering the extension of secured credit need not rely 
on the debtor to disclose existing collateral interests. If the state 
filing office issues a priority certificate, based on the filing of-
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, 
and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, 
the rights and powers of ... 
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the 
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with 
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor 
on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether 
or not such creditor exists. 
11 u.s.c. § 544 (1988). 
107. See id. §§ 547-48 (establishing 90-day and one-year limitations 
periods). 
108. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing possible 
fraud in absence of certain dates for perfection). 
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ficer's review of the records, a creditor would not have to rely on 
the debtor's representation any more than the creditor would 
have to rely on the debtor under the current regime. 
Furthermore, the state filing assurance model could reduce 
the risk of secret liens by requiring that debtors disclose claims 
to the debtor's assets as part of the priority certificate process. 
The debtor would also be required to disclose those events that 
impair the priority of a filed financing statement under the cur-
rent law.109 In addition, it might well prove worthwhile for 
states to coordinate their practices to develop a system of inter-
state checks to aid verification when a debtor's business crosses 
state lines.110 This disclosure obligation could be continuing, so 
that creditors with "filings of record" (or who otherwise sub-
scribe to the system) would receive pertinent noticeslll until 
they file a termination statement.112 Of course, creditors can 
currently provide in loan covenants that debtors make such dis-
closures at the inception of and during the course of the credit 
relationship. But the state could impose criminal sanctions on 
individuals for false swearing.lls 
Although a private insurance (rather than a state filing as-
surance) alternative to the current system might be an improve-
ment over the status quo, one real shortcoming of that type of 
reform is that it would not effect dramatic improvement of the 
system itse1f.114 Private insurers would continue to insure cred-
109. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text (outlining scenarios in 
which the current filing system fails to reveal effective prior claims). 
110. Interstate cooperation in verifying claims would reduce the risk of se-
cret liens in several of the 10 scenarios that Professor LoPucki identified as 
posing the danger of secret liens. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text 
(noting risks when filings appear in other jurisdictions and when filings are 
made against mobile goods before debtor's relocation). 
111. Notices would issue, for example, when the debtor reports a change of 
name, change oflocation, change oflocation of collateral, or change in corporate 
structure. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-401 (stating that a proper filing remains effective 
even though the debtor's location or the location of the collateral subsequently 
changes). 
112. An ongoing disclosure obligation might provide states with an opportu-
nity to share filing system information as a means to check a debtor's veracity. 
This would not be unlike the states' reciprocity systems in the case of drivers' 
licenses. 
113. See Baird, supra note 53, at 61 ("If the legal system needs to be 
changed to give general creditors more protection, additional civil and criminal 
penalties for debtor misbehavior seem more appropriate than requiring more 
information in the filing system.") (citing Jeffrey Helman, Ostensible Ownership 
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 CoM. L.J. 25, 31 (1978)). 
114. A state assurance system would best operate as the intermediate step 
toward privatization of :filing system insurance. Were the states to fix certainly 
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itors against the uncertainties still inherent to the system. 
Although private insurance would rationalize how creditors pay 
for uncertainty, it would not alter the fact that uncertainty costs 
money. 
Individual states' adoption of the state filing assurance al-
ternative, by contrast, would immediately remove uncertainty 
from the system, reducing the cost of secured credit. Further-
more, because the state would be selling priority certificates 
rather than merely providing access to its records, the state 
could make a good deal of money from the business and still 
charge less than the filing system attorneys' fees under the sta-
tus quo. The filing fee would represent the aggregation of risk of 
loss because of filing system error rather than an amount deter-
mined by private counsel's review of sometimes ambiguous 
records. 
Further enhancing its chances for enactment, a revised Ar-
ticle 9 that settles with certainty the perfection issue in the 
bankruptcy context would likely win the support of the large in-
stitutional creditors. The state assurance filing model guaran-
tees perfection and thereby destroys the danger that these 
creditors now face of losing their secured status because a 
trustee in bankruptcy prevails upon a court to defeat the credi-
tors' perfected status. 
For those who favor the bulletin board model and argue that 
the filing system is a source of valuable (albeit expensive) infor-
mation beyond the perfection issue, there would be no reason 
that filing offices could not continue to sell access to their files. 
But once the priority certificate issues, further review of the files 
would not divest a collateral interest. The certificate would es-
tablish both perfection and priority absolutely. 
Finally, to ensure that the state assurance system described 
here in fact provides what the market demands and no more,115 
the system would be voluntary, an option for creditors willing to 
pay for the certainty the assurance provides. A creditor unwill-
ing to pay for perfection and priority assurance could simply file 
a financing statement and pay only a filing fee, not an assurance 
"premium." Provision of the assurance as an alternative rather 
creditors' perfected status and priority, private insurers could less expensively 
insure creditor-policy holder's positions because the perfection and priority de-
terminations would be made at the initiation of the credit, not post hoc, in the 
bankruptcy context. The insurer would not have to charge a premium to reflect 
the risk of post hoc unperfection. 
115. See supra part ID.A (discussing need to frame the :filing system's goals 
in light of the credit system's actual needs). 
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than requiring all creditors to pay for protection some of them 
may not want vindicates market integrity: Real cost savings are 
accomplished by spreading risk, but 'only when the transactor 
determines that it is more efficient to spread the risk rather 
than, effectively, to self-insure. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has described the state of the current Article 9 
filing system in terms of its costs and benefits. It has focused 
attention on an element of cost that has been largely ignored, 
attorneys' fees. It has also suggested that the cost of reforming 
the current system, given the substantial political obstacles to 
reform, would be greater than current advocates of reform might 
appreciate. The Article has also endeavored to distill the bene-
fits provided by the current filing system, and has argued that 
the benefits are not what they may seem to be. The cost of the 
system can only be understood in terms of the very limited bene-
fits the system provides. 
Ultimately, this Article argues that the current system fixes 
a butterfly upon a wheel, expends too much to realize too little. 
All of the significant benefits provided by the current system 
could be provided at far less cost if the incentive for maintaining 
the system were imposed on the entities in the best position to 
improve the system: state filing offices. State coffers would ben-
efit from the cost savings enjoyed by the resulting reduction in 
filing system uncertainty and attorneys' fees. That should not 
be a hard sell with state legislatures and would encourage, 
rather than frustrate, states' adoption of a revised Article 9. 
